Office of Radiological Security Organization of Agreement States
Office of Radiological Security Organization of Agreement States Annual Meeting Boston, MA Kristina Hatcher August 25, 2015 Office of Radiological Security MISSION: The Office of Radiological Security enhances global security by preventing high activity radioactive materials from use in acts of terrorism. PROTECT REMOVE REDUCE PROTECT radioactive sources used for vital medical, research, and commercial purposes REMOVE and dispose of disused radioactive sources REDUCE the global reliance
on radioactive sources through replacement with viable non-isotopic alternative technologies 2 Holistic Approach to Source Security Site security enhancements for radiological and nuclear materials in storage/use Collaborate with manufacturer to install security by device design REACTOR Transportation security addressed throughout entire lifecycle. SOURCE/ DEVICE
PRODUCER TRANSPORT SOURCE LIFE CYCLE FINAL DISPOSITION Site security enhancements for radiological sources in long term storage Site security enhancements for radiological sources in use SOURCE/ DEVICE USER STORAGE Site security enhancements for radiological
sources in storage A LT E R N AT I V E NON-ISOTOPIC TECHNOLOGIES The use of non-isotopic technologies negates the need for security and disposal requirements and eliminates the risk that radioactive sources will become orphaned DEVICE MANUFACTURER DEVICE USER 3 NSS Radiological Security Gift Basket As of January 1, 2015 ORS had secured ~300 Cat 1 Buildings and ~200 buildings remained In FY2015 Omnibus, NNSA received ~$18M plus up to secure all remaining Category 1 facilities the agreement provides $67,987,000 for domestic material protection to help meet the goal of securing all buildings in the U.S. with Category 1 source materials by the end of 2016. ORS currently working on a targeted outreach campaign to elicit the remaining
volunteers Emails, Phone Calls, Website, Webinar, Brochures, Thank You Postcards and Certificates Check out our new webpage at: www.nnsa.energy.gov/RSP 4 Protect: Security Enhancements DETECT DELAY RESPOND TRAIN Prompt Detection and Reliable Notification Extended Adversary Task Time Timely, Aware, Equipped and Trained Response Security and Response Training
Centralized Monitoring Stations Alarm Response Training . Response Planning PRD Training, Tabletop Exercises Next Generation Integrated Remote Monitoring System (iRMS): Critical alarms trigger notification and assessment at monitoring stations Multi-Factor Access Control: Requires combination of card, pin, or biometric scan for entry Hardened Doors Facility Hardening
Personal Radiation Detectors (PRDs) Security Planning, Performance Testing, Regulatory Development RSP Containment Strategy 5 Protect: Sustainability Elements END END GOAL: GOAL: SUSTAINABLE SUSTAINABLE THREAT THREAT REDUCTION REDUCTION RSP assists to address and develop elements of overall security culture that will ensure sustainability in the out years RSP security enhancements include three years of warranty and maintenance support RSP considers existing site security when defining recommendations;
RSP security experts focus on a defense-in-depth approach that starts at the target and adds one or more layers of protection RSP assumes partner sites are in compliance with NRC regulations; RSP recommended security enhancements complement, but do not replace existing regulatory requirements SITE TRA NSI TIO N SITE SUSTAINABILITY WARRENTY & MAINTENANCE SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS NRC/AGREEMENT STATE REGULATIONS 6 Protect: Remote Monitoring System
Next Generation Enhancement More Sustainable Cost Effective Integrated Additional Alarm Notification Capability 7 Protect: Industrial Irradiators Goal: Enhance security against the Insider Threat. Challenge: Applying sufficient detection in conjunction with added delays and response capability Pool Cover Recommended Enhancements at facilities with extremely high radiation, humidity and the need to continuously operate. Virtual Perimeter Pool cover with detection and delay o Pilot installation of pool cover at one facility in Fall 2014 o Pool cover tested May 2015 achieved delay time similar to Cs In-Device Delay kits o Test module at a facility to test wiring and switches for detection shows no degradation to-date 60 days into 90 day testing o In discussion with other large industrial irradiator facilities
Scaled attack test pool cover with left multilayer top plates removed for continuity loop clarity Modular design that can be custom designed to fit irradiator model 8 Protect: Industrial Irradiators Source Rack Testing Planned for October 2015: Determine timelines for adversary to remove a pencil from a source module and rack Test Rack Brute force attack from the side Top down attack on the rack Test will use a mock up of a rack in a pool Scheduled for early October at PNNL Participation from Nordion Mock of irradiator using a pool 9 Protect: In-Device Delay STATUS Partner JL Sheppard CIS/Pharmalucence
Best Theratronics Others TOTAL Estimated Total IDD Eligible Devices 221 131 416 73 841 Total hardened 128 120 232 17 497 *Working Toward New Devices to Come Factory Hardened Current Manufacturer Partners
Best Theratronics (Canada) JL Sheppard (U.S) CIS/Pharmalucence (U.S.) Husman Irradiator (U.S.) Hopewell (U.S.) ViewRay Systems (U.S.) Xcision (U.S.) Elekta Instrument, AB (Sweden) Gamma Services Medical, Gmbh (Germany) CURRENT INITIATIVES Elekta Gamma Knife Hardening Field Kit One Site Pilot installation April 2015 Two Additional Sites Planned for Fall of 2015 Broader Deployment Planned for 2016 Factory Hardened currently working with Xcision Hopewell ViewRay Systems Planned to start work with MASEP (China) in 2016 10
Protect: Mobile Source Transit Security Mobile Device Theft Examples Colombia, 1998. Transport trucks owned by Schlumberger were ambushed and oil/gas exploration sources stolen for extortion. One of the perpetrators was a current employee. Ecuador, 2002. Thieves broke into a storage shed of Interinspec, and stole five Ir192 radiography cameras for extortion. One of the thieves was a former employee. Argentina, 2009 A former employee and accomplice broke into an Atlas Baker storage facility, and stole a Cs137 exploration device for extortion purposes. Syria, 2012/13 Radiography and exploration sources reported stolen from several facilities. No reports of recovery or known motive. China, 2001 Radiation technologist obtained radiography device from friend, removed Ir-192 sources, made a necklace from them, and attempted
to kill girl friend. Nigeria, 2003 Unknown perpetrators stole Am-241 exploration sources from a truck. The sources later turned up in a scrap yard in Germany nine months later. U.S., 2011 Truck broken into and Ir-192 radiography camera stolen. Despite extensive search, no report of recovery or known motive. U.S., 2013 Perpetrator attempted to steal an Ir-192 camera from its storage. He was thwarted by the layered security systems the company had in place. 11 Protect: Mobile Source Transit Security Peculiarities of Mobile Source Vulnerabilities For radiography sources, lots of material in motion worldwide all the time Short source material half lives require constant device replenishment Material providers represent a diverse set of research reactors across the globe Device manufacturers AND device users often international companies For both radiography cameras and well logging sources, storage locations are different than use locations
Requires movement from storage locations to field application Field site security highly likely to be less stringent than storage facility security Often used in parts of the world where overall security is an issue and terror groups are potentially present Designed to be mobile once lost, hard to find 12 Protect: Mobile Source Transit Security Well Logging Radiography PM Tag (Built into Camera) Rad Detection - Monitors source presence, alarms if removed Tamper Detection Alarm if camera is tampered with Location alerts/alarms if out of range PM-Box (Replaces Current Transport Box, Installed on Truck and Stores Camera)
Tamper Detection Alert when device is removed without check-out Worker provides administrative notification of check out Charging station R Tag & Master Control Unit E Tag (On Container) (In Truck Storage) Tamper Detection Rad Detection Monitors Alarm when source is source presence, alarms if removed from container removed Location alarms if out Communication from E-Tag of range without to the R-Tag and MCU is via checkout Bluetooth
Project Status Partnering with major radiography and oil service companies to design and pilot systems, field studies completed in early 2015 Con ops to be developed with partners Plan to pilot in Fall 2015 and start broad deployment in U.S. in 2016 Developing plans to deploy with international partners Telematics (Cellular/Satellite Communications used by Many U.S. Companies) Transmits GPS location and security alarms/alerts Base Station Application software Receives alarms, alerts, notifications, location Source Storage System will be integrated into site storage, providing persistent monitoring of sources and increased detection and delay. 13 Remove
U.S. OFF-SITE SOURCE RECOVERY PROGRAM (OSRP) & SOURCE COLLECTION & THREAT REDUCTION (SCATR) OSRP - recover disused and unwanted radioactive sealed sources that cannot be disposed of commercially and pose a threat to national security SCATR recover and disposition commercially disposable radioactive sealed sources SCATR & OSRP registration located at: http://osrp.lanl.gov/PickUpSources.aspx COORDINATION WITH CONFERENCE OF RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM DIRECTORS (CRCPD): Developing Device Packaging Training at Southwest Research Institute (SWRI). Material to be complete in September. Participating on the CRCPD working group to develop regulatory guidance for packaging Cat 1 and 2 sources. STATUS of TYPE B CONTAINER DEVELOPMENT 435-B Unshielded Overpack can ship 5 different irradiators and the IAEA Long-Term Storage Shield Fabrication in process. Anticipate ready for use in early 2016. 380-B Shielded Container can ship problematic devices Safety Analysis Report (SAR) being prepared for submission to NRC 14 Reduce: Alternative Technologies Initiative seeks to convert and replace radiological devices with non-isotopic devices and achieve permanent threat reduction by reducing or eliminating risk-significant radioactive materials Cesium Irradiator Replacement Project
A pilot project to offer incentives to replace Cesium irradiators with alternative technologies Non-radioactive x-ray device poses no RDD risk; no federally funded security enhancements are required. Does not need to be disposed of as low level or Greater Than Class C (GTCC) waste Cobalt Teletherapy Replacements NNSA, in coordination with the State Department, funded the shipment of a used medical LINAC to Ukraine. We are working with global partners to develop options for expansion of Cobalt teletherapy replacements Research and Development Collaboration with the Office of Nonproliferation Research and Development (NA-22) to analyze and prioritize R&D requirements for improvement or development of non-isotopic replacements to make alternative technologies more attractive to industry.
Linear Accelerator is an alternative to Cobalt Teletherapy Consultations available to sites interested in replacing their existing high-activity source with non-isotopic alternatives 15 National Protection and Programs Directorate Department of Homeland Security Alternative Technology Working Group Background The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) (Public Law 109-58) emphasized the importance of non-isotopic replacement technology development and implementation to reduce the risks posed by radioactive sealed sources in wide use domestically in the areas of research, industry, and medicine. As progress in the technical, operational, and economic feasibility of these replacements continues, policy options to facilitate their implementation have become increasingly important. At the March 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, the United States introduced the U.S. Government commitment to establish an international research effort on the feasibility of replacing high-activity [radioactive] sources with non-isotopic technologies, with the goal of producing a global alternative by 2016. 16 National Protection and Programs Directorate Department of Homeland Security Alternative Technology Working Group Background (cont.)
In August 2014, the U.S. Interagency recommended in the 2014 Report of the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force, that the U.S. Government, as appropriate, investigate options such as voluntary, prioritized, incentivized, [sic] programs for the replacement of Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources with effective alternatives. The Task Force further recommends that U.S. Government agencies, where appropriate, that lead by example in the consideration of and transition to alternative technologies that meet technical, operational, and cost requirements. Nuclear Government Coordinating Council initiated the formation of an Alternative Technologies Working Group to look at the advantages/disadvantages of alternate technologies for replacement of category 1 and 2 radioactive sources. 17 National Protection and Programs Directorate Department of Homeland Security Alternative Technology Working Group Working Group Members Total Membership: 100 Academia: 5 Law Enforcement: 1 Private Sector: 45 State/Local Government: 9 Federal Government: 40 18 National Protection and Programs Directorate
Department of Homeland Security Alternative Technology Working Group Working Group Timeline Schedule of Meetings and Discussion Topics February 2015 Kick-off Meeting March 2015 Cesium-137 Blood Irradiation April 2015 Cesium-137 Blood Irradiation May 2015 Cesium-137 Blood Irradiation/Research Irradiation July 2015 Cesium-137/Cobalt-60 Research Irradiation and Phytosanitary Applications August 2015 Stereotactic Surgery (Co-60 and LINACS) September 2015 Industrial Sterilization (Co-60 panoramic irradiators) October 2015 Industrial Radiography November 2015 Well Logging 19 National Protection and Programs Directorate Department of Homeland Security Alternative Technology Working Group Working Group Timeline (cont.) Schedule for Report Development October 2015 Roadmap and Message Development November 2015 Finalization of WG Report and Identification of Stakeholders December 2015 Update on Draft Report January 2016 Issue Final Report at Joint Nuclear CIPAC and recommend
Next Steps 20 National Protection and Programs Directorate Department of Homeland Security Alternative Technology Working Group For more information, visit: 21 Additional Working Groups International Ad Hoc Group on Alternative Technologies The goal of the group is to exchange views and ideas that help develop an international roadmap on alternative technology. Health Physics Society Task Force on Alternative Technologies This group will bring together users of high activity radiological sources to discuss opportunities and acceptance of alternative technologies. National Science and Technology Council Working group to look at the issue of alternative technologies under the Committee on Homeland and National Security. A primary objective of the NSTC is the establishment of clear national goals for Federal science and technology investments in a broad array of areas. 22 Cesium Irradiator Replacement Program
Cesium Irradiator Replacement Program (CIRP) - ORS has initiated a CIRP pilot effort that incentivizes domestic users who choose to convert from a cesiums-137 irradiator to a non-isotopic alternative (e.g., X-ray irradiator). ORS is in the process of evaluating the CIRP Pilot for broader applicability for FY16 implementation. ORS has received numerous inquiries as well as volunteers to participate in CIRP. 23 Research and Development ORS is working in collaboration with Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNNR&D) within NNSA to identify gaps and fund technology developments for non-isotopic devices that are not yet commercially available. Research in alternative technologies includes: Superconducting LINAC X-ray source (panoramic irradiator) Flat panel X-ray sources (blood, sterilization and research irradiation) Micro-linacs (radiography and well logging) Dense Plasma Focus (well logging) ORS and DNNR&D are working together to create a research and development roadmap for alternative technologies. This roadmap will look at each application (e.g. blood irradiation, research, etc), the currently available technologies and the identified needs or gaps. Once the gaps or needs are identified, the roadmap will outline the path forward for improving, or in some cases developing, the technology.
24 Contact Joy Ferguson Program Director Domestic Radiological Security [email protected] 202-287-6845 Regional Officer Domestic Radiological Security [email protected] 202-586-7544 Kristina Hatcher Check out our new webpage at: ww.nnsa.energy.gov/RSP 25
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