Transcription

TIGHTENING THE CHAINIMPLEMENTING A STRATEGY OFMARITIME PRESSURE IN THE WESTERN PACIFICTHOMAS G. MAHNKENTRAVIS SHARP BILLY FABIANPETER KOURETSOS

TIGHTENING THE CHAINIMPLEMENTING A STRATEGY OFMARITIME PRESSURE INTHE WESTERN PACIFICTHOMAS G. MAHNKENTRAVIS SHARPBILLY FABIANPETER KOURETSOS2019

ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC ANDBUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS (CSBA)The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is an independent, nonpartisan policyresearch institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national securitystrategy and investment options. CSBA’s analysis focuses on key questions related to existing andemerging threats to U.S. national security, and its goal is to enable policymakers to make informeddecisions on matters of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation. 2019 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved.

ABOUT THE AUTHORSThomas G. Mahnken is President and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for Strategic andBudgetary Assessments. He is a Senior Research Professor at the Philip Merrill Center forStrategic Studies at The Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced InternationalStudies (SAIS) and has served for over 20 years as an officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve, to includetours in Iraq and Kosovo. He currently serves as a member of the Congressionally mandatedNational Defense Strategy Commission and as a member of the Board of Visitors of MarineCorps University. His previous government career includes service as Deputy Assistant Secretaryof Defense for Policy Planning from 2006–2009, where he helped craft the 2006 QuadrennialDefense Review and 2008 National Defense Strategy. He served on the staff of the 2014 NationalDefense Panel, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, and the Commission on theIntelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. He servedin the Defense Department’s Office of Net Assessment and as a member of the Gulf War Air PowerSurvey. In 2009 he was awarded the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Serviceand in 2016 the Department of the Navy Superior Civilian Service Medal.Travis Sharp is a Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Hedirects the budget program and works to educate and inform policymakers, senior leaders, and thegeneral public about the defense budget and issues pertaining to resourcing national security. Healso serves as an officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve while completing his Ph.D. in security studiesat Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Travis hasheld positions with academic and policy organizations, including George Washington University’sInstitute for Security and Conflict Studies, West Point’s Modern War Institute, the Office of theSecretary of Defense, the Center for a New American Security, and the Center for Arms Control andNon-Proliferation. He has published think tank monographs, journal articles, and commentaries ondefense spending and strategy, cybersecurity, and military-to-military contacts between great powerrivals, the topic of his dissertation. Mr. Sharp is a past recipient of the Sasakawa Young LeadersFellowship, the A.B. Krongard and John Parker Compton Fellowships at Princeton, the 1LT BacevichFellowship at CNAS, the Harold Rosenthal Fellowship in International Relations, and the HerbertScoville Peace Fellowship.Billy Fabian is a Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Hisresearch focuses on military strategy and operations, future warfighting concepts, and land warfare.Prior to joining CSBA, Billy worked as Senior Strategic Analyst in the Office of the Deputy AssistantSecretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development, where he assisted in the developmentof the 2018 National Defense Strategy. He has also served as Strategic Planner in the U.S. Army’sOffice of Strategy, Plans, and Policy in the Pentagon, and as a Presidential Management Fellow atthe Center for Army Analysis on Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Billy served as an Infantry officer in the U.S.Army from 2003--2009.Peter Kouretsos is an Analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. At CSBAhis work focuses on U.S. defense policy and strategy, long term competition, future warfare, andWestern Hemisphere security. In addition, Pete assists in the design and analysis of CSBA’soperational-level wargames and concept development workshops. Prior to CSBA, Pete was theResearch Assistant at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies. His previous experience alsoincludes work in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy’s Office of Strategy & ForceDevelopment. He is a member of the Military Operations Research Society.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTSThe authors would like to thank Ross Babbage, Hal Brands, Bryan Clark, Evan Montgomery, MajorGeneral Mick Ryan, Toshi Yoshihara, and several reviewers who wish to remain anonymous fortheir insightful comments on previous drafts of this report. We would also like to thank KamillaGunzinger for her editing and publication support. The analysis and findings presented here arenonetheless solely the responsibility of the authors. CSBA receives funding from a broad anddiverse group of contributors, including private foundations, government agencies, and corporations. A complete list of these organizations can be found on our website at www.csbaonline.org/about/contributors.Cover: First land-based Naval Strike Missile launch performed at RIMPAC 2018 exercise. U.S. Armyphoto by David Hogan.

ContentsCHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Strategy in Brief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Advantages of a Maritime Pressure Strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Contributions of the Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7CHAPTER 2: STRATEGIC CONTEXT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11What Are the U.S. Concerns About China’s Rise?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Chinese Moves and American Countermoves. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13What the Force Might Need to Do: Future Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTS, CAPABILITIES, AND COORDINATIONFOR A STRATEGY OF MARITIME PRESSURE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Solving the Problems: Inside-Out as a Point of Departure Operational Concept. . . . . . . . . . . 27What the Force Is Doing: Current Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45Recommended Changes to Concepts, Capabilities, and Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54Anticipating Chinese Reactions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56CHAPTER 4: POTENTIAL COSTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59Estimated Costs through 2024. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68CHAPTER 5: NEXT STEPS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69LIST OF ACRONYMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

FIGURESFIGURE 1: TYRANNY OF DISTANCE AND TIME IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14FIGURE 2: LITTORAL EAST ASIA FROM CHINA’S PERSPECTIVE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15FIGURE 3: NOTIONAL MULTI-DOMAIN GROUND UNIT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29FIGURE 4: INSIDE-OUT DEFENSE OVERVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31FIGURE 5: OVERLAPPING COVERAGE OF GROUND-BASED SEA-DENIAL SYSTEMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32FIGURE 6: MEASURES TO IMPROVE RESILIENCY OF INSIDE FORCES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35FIGURE 7: LAND-BASED LONG-RANGE STRIKE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36FIGURE 8: CURRENT AND FUTURE U.S. ARMY GROUND-LAUNCHED SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51TABLESTABLE 1: COSTS OF MARITIME PRESSURE STRATEGY, 2020–2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

www.csbaonline.orgCHAPTER 1IntroductionThe U.S. military has a problem in the Western Pacific: the tyranny of distance and time.Delivering military force across the vast Pacific Ocean has never been easy, even for a countryas blessed in resources and ingenuity as the United States. The problem has worsened asAmerica’s chief regional rival, China, has improved its ability to harm American interestsquickly with limited forewarning. China’s military capabilities have increasingly matured tothe point where, if directed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the People’s LiberationArmy (PLA) could launch a rapid attack to change the status quo, including territorial seizure,before the United States could meaningfully respond, thus presenting Washington and itsallies with a fait accompli.1 American forces located outside the conflict area would have topenetrate China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) network to restore the status quo ante,a daunting proposition.2 As General Robert Neller, commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps,remarked, “We are going to have to fight to get to the fight.”3 Under these circumstances,American political leaders might face the unenviable choice of doing nothing or escalating tohigher levels of violence. Either way, the national interests of both the United States and itsclosest allies would suffer dramatically.1The report uses fait accompli in the sense of “a quick, decisive transformation of the situation” before the other sidecan immediately react. For definitional discussion see Ahmer Tarar, “A Strategic Logic of the Military Fait Accompli,”International Studies Quarterly 60, no. 4, December 2016, pp. 743–744.2Following the Department of Defense (DoD), the report defines anti access (A2) as “Action, activity, or capability, usuallylong-range, designed to prevent an advancing enemy force from entering an operational area.” It defines area denial (AD)as “Action, activity, or capability, usually short-range, designed to limit an enemy force’s freedom of action within anoperational area.” Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), DOD Dictionary of Military and AssociatedTerms (Washington, DC: JCS, February 2019), pp. 19–20.3Robert B. Neller, testimony before the House Appropriations Committee–Defense, March 7, 2018, p. 4.1

2CSBA TIGHTENING THE CHAINAmerican policymakers are right to worry about such a scenario.4 History shows thatdeterrence is more likely to fail when an aggressor believes it can pull off a fait accomplisuccessfully.5 Russia demonstrated as much by annexing Crimea in 2014 without provokingmeaningful resistance or counterattack. Chinese military doctrine emphasizes the need tostrike first to surprise the enemy, dictate the operational tempo, and achieve victory beforesustaining heavy losses.6 If the U.S. military fails to prepare now for a potential Chinese faitaccompli attempt, it will cede the ability to deter and, if necessary, defeat Chinese aggression.This report proposes a military strategy of Maritime Pressure, which includes a newInside-Out Defense operational concept, to address the fait accompli problem. The strategyand concept entail fielding precision-strike networks, particularly land-based anti-ship andanti-air capabilities, along the First Island Chain to contest China’s ability to achieve gainsthrough aggression quickly and without paying steep costs in blood, treasure, and reputation.Numerous analysts have proposed similar approaches over the past decade, but the reportgoes beyond previous studies by outlining a new operational concept, assessing potentialChinese responses, and estimating the budgetary costs of implementing it.As a defensive-oriented denial strategy, Maritime Pressure can complement or substitute foralternative approaches such as blockade operations or punishment strikes against mainlandChina. Those alternatives, although potentially useful as part of a broader campaign to prevailin a protracted conflict with China, would likely not achieve success rapidly enough to thwart afait accompli and could escalate the conflict beyond the risk tolerances of U.S. and allied political leaders. Without a strategy designed to prevent a fait accompli, the United States mightlose a war before alternative approaches have time to be effective.The Maritime Pressure strategy answers the call by the National Defense Strategy Commissionto prepare for great power competition by “develop[ing] new operational concepts to achievestrategic advantage,” including “establishing a forward-de